Pacific Palisades residents gathered about 100 days after they evacuated their homes, which burned. Many others cannot return until homes have been remediated from smoke damage. Photo: RICH SCHMITT/CTN
People were happy to see their neighbors in person on Saturday. Photo: RICH SCHMITT/CTN
About six weeks ago, Amalfi Founder Anthony Marguleas, who lost his home in Pacific Palisades had an idea. “I thought it’d be a good to get the community back together since people were getting so zoomed out and we’re miss seeing their neighbors and their friends,” he said.
After the January 7 Palisades Fire, residents were forced to find apartments and rentals throughout Southern California. The neighbors that people spoke to and saw daily were in the South Bay, in Santa Barbara, in other states.
“In the wake of the devastation, I felt there was an urgent need to create a space where our community could come together,” Marguleas said, noting this was not just about grieving what was lost, but to “reconnect, support one another, and begin healing. This event was about reminding each other that we’re not alone, and that together, we will rebuild stronger than ever.”
With 1Pali Founders Ben Perlman and Andrew Grant, the three planned an event that was held at Clover Park in Santa Monica on April 19. Aided by Sue Marguleas and Anthony’s assistant Rachel Aronson, the park was filled with nearly 2,000 people who gathered to visit booths, have food, such McConnell’s ice cream and pizza supplied by Flour. The owner Robert Flutie, not only lost his Palisades home but his shop on January 7. He has since opened a place in Brentwood, but has plans to also come back to Pacific Palisades. Shawna McConald of the Band 1969 sang the National Anthem.
With stalwart Palisadian Sam Lagana as an emcee, the Palisades High School band was first to perform. The high school had also burned and have not been able to hold practices since January, although with a special invite they had played the National Anthem at the Hollywood Bowl in early April.
The Palisades High School band played the “fight” song. Photo: RICH SCHMITT/CTN
The band played the PaliHi fight song that is played at football games. Lagana said it was written in 1962 by then orchestra/band teacher Joel Lish, who also founded the Palisades Symphony (also now displaced).
Lagana said the day reminded him of when you went to the grocery store or the church in town, you would run into people you knew and this day was important for everyone after the isolation caused by the fire.
“People also liked engaging with Colonel Swenson and Councilwoman Traci Park,” Lagana said. “They were happy and floating around and enjoying the company of people they knew and they met. The power of positivity reigns in the people of Pacific Palisades.”
Swenson, who is charge of the Army Corps of Engineers said, “It’s an honor to be here today.” He noted that there were 97 crews currently working in the Palisades, and “there is a huge push on PCH (Pacific Coast Highway).” Governor Gavin Newsom wants to open PCH at the end of May, and clearing the houses along that road is necessary.
“Our goal is to get our part done as rapidly as possible, so you can rebuild safely on your lots,” Swenson said, “and get you back in as soon as possible.”
Councilmember Traci Park said, “It is wonderful to reconnect in person.” She said that the Corps is moving at warp speed, and that rebuilding should be “community led and government supported.”
Past Palisades Honorary Mayor Jake Steinfeld, who also lost his home in the fire, read a poem that was given to him when he was cut from his 8th grade basketball team, “Don’t Quit.”
L.A. Mayor Karen Bass said, “That poem really hits you in the heart.” And spoke how this recovery would be the fastest in the nation. “From the grief, we turn to the hope,” she said. “I will stay with you until you’re home.”
Marguleas told CTN that “Yesterday’s event was a powerful reminder of the strength and spirit of our community. While many of us are still rebuilding, it was deeply moving to see neighbors, friends, and families come together in solidarity and hope. The support shown reflects the heart of the Palisades — resilient, compassionate, and united.”
(Left to right) Anthony Marquleas welcomed Colonel Eric Swenson, Jake Steinfeld and Sam Lagana to the gathering of Palisades residents. Photo: RICH SCHMITT/CTN
Palisades High School Fight Song
By Joel Lish
Oh we are the Dolphins so get get nervous
While we are here we will make you serve us.
Palisades! Palisades!
All is right with the blue and the white!
So head for the hills and don’t look behind you,
When we get through they will never find you.
Palisades! Palisades!
On to Victory !!!
The Tramonto landslide closed one lane of traffic between Sunset Boulevard and Porto Marina. Photo: Murray
Last year one of the northbound Pacific Coast Highway lanes was closed for several months after heavy rains caused the Tramonto landslide (just north of Porto Marino) to dump mud on the roadway.
Then Caltrans wrote, “since the slide is too unstable to clear the dirt from the northbound right lane, lanes were realigned lanes on PCH to create a second northbound lane. There was no additional space in the median to create another lane. All northbound and southbound lanes were shifted towards the shoreline”
That bluff in Castellammare had experienced slope failure in 1958, 1982, 1998, 2001 and 2005.
A Malibu radio station, KBUU, ran a March 20, 2025, story about that slide area, “Another House Collapses Above the Cliff That Is Threatening PCH Near Sunset Boulevard.”
The report said that a house near the Getty Villa Museum was damaged in the fire, but before that it had been damaged in the Tramonto landslide. And now it slid further down the hill, landing on top of a house that split in half earlier that year.
“Both houses have come to rest of Castellammare Drive … a small hillside street that’s been sliding towards Pacific Coast Highway for decades. . . .putting pressure on the cliff above PCH.”
“The city of Los Angeles and Caltrans have been grappling with this slow-moving disaster … which last year closed one of the two lanes heading towards Malibu for months.
“The 100-year-old concrete retaining walls just above the highway are buckling in several areas … between Sunset Boulevard and Porto Marina Way.”
Last year Caltrans told CTN that the landslide is on City property and the fix has to come from them.
Given that, one might expect the City to go out of its way to help a resident with dewatering that cliff.
On March 17, 2025, Bart Young of Falkenberg/Gilliam & Associates wrote: “I am concerned about the apparent water bleeding through the shotcrete at the base. If the bulkhead gives way at the base, the top will collapse. This what I believe needs to be tapped and relieved of the water trapped inside.”
If the Tramonto Bulkhead collapses, the one road in and out of Castellammare will be impacted.
Young told CTN that temporary power pole was needed to run some dewatering pumps on his property. One might imagine the city might step in to assist to ensure that streets and roads stay open.
No. To make matters worse, the steps for a private citizen are complicated and costly.
To install a temporary electric meter on the location where the permanent one was already located will require 13 steps and up to $7,000 to provide a $200 electric meter. And the electricity is an extra charge.
Here are the steps Young is required to do just to replace something that was in operation before the fire. Most of the money goes to DWP to approve the pole location and inspection.
LADBS– Temporary Permit for a Spot Meter – Young went to LADBS in Person in West LA – $131 – Done. Took ½ day to get there and back. It took 15 minutes to complete form.
ACO Temporary Power(company that provides onsite power) – Sign contract for $784.75, ACO to contact LADWP to pay the initial $370 DWP fee, and to complete a temporary utility account.
ACOwill attain the contact information to your Electrical Service Representative (ESR) they share with the customer.
Customerthen needs to contact the DWP ESR for an underground meter spot.
ESRs are very difficult to reach. They don’t answer phone calls or emails. Customers are on their own tracking them down. This is why ACO does not handle this step.
DWP ESRtells customers where the conduit is and where the pole can be placed. Young said, “it is going exactly where it was before.”
DWP opens the Manhole:During the meter spot process, they will bill you the additional $3,000 -5,000 invoice for the underground work.
Customer sends images:Once theCustomerknows where the conduit is located they need to expose it and send images to ACO to confirm the connection point.
ACO Confirmation:Once all onsite conditions are confirmed ACOwill install the temporary power pole.
LADBS Inspection:After it is installed, an inspection by LADBS is required.
ESR Inspection:Once the inspection is complete it goes back to LAWDP for a second inspection with your ESR.
ACO Installs:Once both inspections are approved LADWP and LADBS, ACO assigns your job for the meter installation to finalize the energization of your pole.
Once operational there is $54.75 per 28-day billing cycle for the use of the pole. Electricity is billed monthly at the regular rate based on usage.
Cost Summary
$131 LADBS Permit
$370 DWP permit fee
$785 to ACO to install
$3000 – $5000 to DWP to locate the underground conduit
$713 / year to ACO for rental on the temp power pole
Total: $4,999 to $6,999 for the first year
The actual cost of the meter is $200 plus the wooden pole.
Young, who finally hired an expeditor, said that person reached someone high up at DWP who asked someone to contact them …which they did.
That person said they would be able to request step 7 if we had already completed sets 1 through 6 — which we had not. Step 1, visiting LADBS’ West Division to request a permit for temporary power, took an entire day of travel because our temporary living situation is in South Orange County now.
“The process is complicated with many inefficient and redundant steps proposed by DWP and LADBS,” Young said. “Look carefully at the steps listed and you’ll see how it considers the homeowner’s or contractor’s time as being worthless. During Step 2, after hearing my confusion about how much it takes to install temporary power, the nice lady at ACO Temporary Power outlined the steps for me.”
If more of the Tramonto Landslide tumbles onto PCH, possibly closing additional lanes, don’t blame Young, he’s trying.
The Tramonto Bulkhead was damaged in the fire. Young’s property is left of the bulkhead.
Plants are blooming profusely in Pacific Palisades, along walls and walkways.
For Christians, Easter symbolizes not only spiritual renewal but the date usually comes with the arrival of spring, with themes of rebirth and new beginnings.
It seems an apt time to show what has risen out of Pacific Palisades ashes.
The plants in our yard on Radcliffe were blackened as the fire came through on January 7 burning our home. The strawberry plants were hit on January 8, the day the detached garage burned.
On Valentine’s Day, with the help of my daughter and husband, we dug up two cycads (prehistoric plants) and the strawberry plants, which seemed to be alive and replanted them in pots on the balcony of the apartment. When we were in the dirt, there were ants and worms. The birds had already returned.
CYCADS:
These two cycads, which started as small house plants, and I had been growing for 20 years, had been burned by the rapidly moving fire. My mother, a master gardener had done research and said those plants in Australia had come back after the fires there, which is why we decided to try to save them.
Two cycads, which had grown inside for years, were transplanted into our yard on Radcliffe about 10 years ago.
On March 28, one of the cycads started to sprout–the leave come up as fuzzy little brown shoots.
The second cycad is slower to rebound, but there are now tiny little brown fuzzy shoots starting to show and I’m hoping this one will recover from the fire, too.
STRAWBERRRIES
The strawberry plants were green and growing when they were dug up.
April 7, strawberry blossoms are starting to form.
This small single-family home on Albright Street survived the fire–all other new modern homes around it on the street burned. Standing home yards were the subject of tests.
L.A. County Public Health used Dr. Adam Love of Roux, Inc. to test the soil of the standing homes in the communities damaged by the Eaton and Palisades Fires. Love leads Roux Associates’ Litigation Practice Group and provides forensic litigation support and expert witness services to clients throughout the United States on both environmental litigation and environmental insurance coverage related matters.
Specifically, soil samples were tested in intact homes/yards in the burn area. Between March 4 to 11, 780 parcels were tested, with about five samples per parcel, roughly 4,000 samples.
The findings? In Pacific Palisades “Widespread contamination from potentially fire-related chemicals are not evident,” the report stated. “There was some sampling of soils from isolated areas that had heavy metal and PAH concentration above screen levels, but the source for these localized impacts is unknown at this time. They are not consistent with communitywide impacts from fire-related smoke plumes.”
Eaton’s testing was not as positive as the Palisades. Intact parcels had lead levels above health-based screening thresholds downwind of the Eaton Fire. “This is consistent with the known age of housing stock in Altadena and the potential for lead-based paint.” (Lead paint was banned in 1978. It is estimated that 90 percent of the homes in Altadena were built prior to 1975 and still have that paint on the walls.)
The results were released on April 10 and love spoke during Mayor Karen Bass April 15 weekly meeting, to view the results click here or to see the video (Love is about 15 minutes into the video).
Residents who had concerns about their property may want to do their own testing click here.
As part of the CLEAN Project (Contaminant Level Evaluation and Assessment for Neighborhoods) through USC, a resident collected two tablespoon amounts of soil, listed the coordinates (can be found on google maps) of the collection and area where it was taken from (i.e. backyard, frontyard, garden). The American Legion was a collection site and the resident dropped them there about 10 days ago.
The resident was concerned because the house was in the upper Alphabet Streets and was completely surrounded by homes that were burnt to the ground.
The results of the lead score for this residence was 122 (ppm). In 2024, the EPA set a safety threshold for lead levels of 200 parts per million (ppm). Soils above this threshold may be hazardous, and more rigorous testing is recommended click here.
Cal EPA/OEHHA uses a level of 80 ppm as their screening level cutoff where concentrations may be unsafe for young children, fetuses and women who are pregnant. According to OEHHA, soil lead levels of 80 ppm are “highly unlikely to produce adverse effects to the most sensitive individuals exposed in a residential setting.”
The report also notes that lead occurs naturally in soil at low levels and below 80 ppm, you can grow food in these soils and children can play in the yards.
If a sample’s result is “<LOD,” that means lead levels were below the testing instrument’s limit of detection (LOD). The LOD is different depending on the sample, but is generally around 20 ppm.
The report also notes that in Los Angeles, generations of human activity (leaded gasoline) have contributed to a heightened level of lead in soils citywide. Even before the fires, much of the city’s soils would have exceeded the California lead screening level.
Palisades Bowl resident Jon Brown spoke about the enormity of losing his home at the Palisades Bowl. He is surrounded by residents and city, county and state officials. In the background is Palisades Bowl.
At the two-hour press conference held by State Senator Ben Allen at Will Rogers State Beach across from Palisades Bowl, a diverse assortment of officials gathered to help mark 100 days since the start of the Palisades Fire. All were eager to show how they’ve helped residents.
While the mostly self-congratulatory remarks were being made, the audience and cameras were situated to see the devastation of the Palisades Bowl Mobile Home Park across Pacific Coast Highway. Four hundred people are without a home, another 300 residents in the adjoining Tahitian Terrace, are also homeless.
Allen, who also acted as the emcee, said, “We have lots to celebrate, but we have so much to do.” He said that the state of California had passed $2.5 billion in state relief to support emergency response.
State Senator Sasha Perez, who represents the Eaton area and who was only in her second day of office when the fire happened, said that there are 12 bills currently in the legislature to help victims.
Insurance Commissioner Ricardo Lara said that the top priority was for “people to recover quickly and on their own terms.” He pointed out that his office provided for more than 1,000 survivors through four events. “There have been 38,000 claims filed and 27,000 partially paid. The market is responding as it should,” Lara said.
L.A. Mayor Karen Bass said, “I feel proud of what we’ve been able to do.” She listed accomplishments as setting up the disaster recover center that had helped 9,000 people, the speed at which the Army Corps of Engineers is clearing lots – it took only six days to clear the Palisades Library. “We’re on track to have the fastest recovery of a disaster in U.S. History.”
Councilmember Traci Park had just returned from a trip to Lahaina. She had paid out of her own funds to go and see if there were any lessons that could be learned and applied to Pacific Palisades. “We need to take a moment for the lives that were lost in the fires,” she said, and spoke about the gravity of what was lost. “We demand answers, and I called for an after-action report,” she said.
Pro Tem Malibu Mayor Marianne Riggins said, “The City is looking at long-term options and has waived the fees for like-buildings and is working on micro-grants for businesses. We’ve removed barriers to streamline changes for rebuilding.”
“One hundred days is not enough to feel settled or whole again,” she said.
L.A. County Assessor Jeff Prang spoke about aligning the assessment standards between the County and the City. (Editor’s note: he had several other important updates that will be in a future story.)
Allen spoke about the introduction of Senate Bill 749 that will reduce discrepancy in law between affordable housing vs. mobile homes. If the owner wants to close the park or change the use of the land, i.e. from affordable to market-value housing (even after a disaster), they would first have to give residents or qualified affordable housing nonprofits/entities the opportunity to purchase the land in order to maintain its use as affordable housing, and they will be forced to sell the land if either group can meet market value.
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He invited Bowl resident Jon Brown to speak. Brown, who has lived at the Bowl with wife and two children, was accompanied to the podium by three other residents. Brown, a 10-year resident of the Bowl, spoke about the 99-year-old woman who lived in one home and of two other women who swam daily in the pool. “At least a quarter of the residents were senior citizens,” he said “This is one of the last pieces of affordable housing in Pacific Palisades.”
City Attorney Hydee Feldstein Soto said that Senate Bill 522 seeks to extend local rent control regulations on residential properties rebuilt after the Los Angeles County fires. It has not passed yet.
To cap the afternoon, Heidi Sanborn who founded the nonprofit, the National Stewardship Action Council in 2015, spoke about the future and how we need to make everything more fire resilient and stop hazardous products in our homes that burn in wildfires.
This editor had three flashlights in her home. They all had batteries, they all burned – producing hazardous waste. The house had been remodeled in 1994, which meant the asbestos had been removed and the lead paint gone. There was one propane tank under the barbeque it survived – because a wall fell on top of it. The sides of the home were stucco, which is fire resistant.
The roof was asphalt – also considered fire-resistant. There were no attic vents. Brush clearance was done.
Why did the home burn? The house was “hardened.” The term is what all fire victims who are rebuilding are now lectured to do. Fire is a chemical reaction between fuel and oxygen in the air. A fire will occur any time the temperature is high enough.
To put out a fire, one needs water or a retardant, not lectures.
What has the National Stewardship Action done?
According to their website, NSAC offers consulting services to state and local governments, corporations, and other organizations to identify solutions to materials management issues for products. These include tobacco and cannabis waste, carpet, packaging, pharmaceuticals, sharps, solar panels, mattresses, textiles, hazardous waste including paint, critical earth minerals such as batteries and solar panels, and much more click here.
The group has provided expert testimony in California: 1. Assembly bill 622 (Allen) which would eliminate an unnecessary mandate requiring licensed cannabis cultivators to affix a single-use plastic tag to each cannabis plant. 2. Senate bill 676 (Allen) which would allow a city/county to enact or enforce any regulation that prohibits the installation of synthetic grass or artificial turf. 3. Assembly bill 1059 (Friedman) which prohibits juvenile products, mattresses, or upholstered furniture that contains textile fiberglass, and restricts the use of flame-retardant chemicals in adult mattresses.
When a resident has been through the Palisades Fire and their home has burned and all of their possessions and memorabilia are gone, the last thing they need is a lecture about the future and how recycling will prevent hazardous wastes from burning.
This editor pointed to the mounds of trash that was all that was left of the Palisades Bowl and asked Allen, “The next big rain and that goes in the ocean, it seems that would be an immediate concern.”
Immediately Feldstein Soto was brought to the lectern and explained that there were still 63 properties that had neither opted in nor opted out. She was asked if that was one of them. She didn’t know.
One of the many questions that was not answered was “How did this fire get out of control and why wasn’t there water to stop it and why wasn’t the electricity turned off to prevent additional arching/sparking?”
And most importantly, “How can you ensure this will never happen again?”
(Editor’s note: Some think that marine animals, such as this sick sea lion, are having issues because of the hazardous waste coming from fire debris.
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Be Rosy, a nail salon on Via de la Paz, burned in the Palisades Fire.
The salon at 861 Via de la Paz, Be Rosy was destroyed in the Palisades Fire, but continues to make house calls and now has an in-person location.
The owner, Cat, sent the following note: “The Palisades community along with Be Rosy are all actively collaborating with Insurance, FEMA, and/or SBA, striving to navigate our next steps while managing displacement. Despite all this hardship, it is essential that we also find a way to restore a sense of normalcy in our lives.”
The salon is operating out of a temporary location in Beverly Hills, providing services to one client at a time and former clients are urged to book an appointment. Once an appointment is booked, the details of the temporary location will be given.
Starting on March 30, Lori Banks, one of the salon’s dedicated technicians, will join Be Rosy on Wednesdays and Thursdays. Please note that this is not a walk-in establishment and appointments have to be scheduled click here.
The owner wrote, “for those who visited us in recent months, thank you so much. Your support has been beyond crucial and therapeutic.
Operating hours are:
Monday: 9 a.m. to 3 p.m.
Tuesday: 9 a.m. to 6 p.m.
Wednesday and Thursday: 11 a.m. to 6 p.m. (Lori)
Friday: 9 a.m. to 3 p.m.
Saturday: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
For those that need or want home services, there is still the Be Rosy On-The-Go option. “We look forward to seeing you soon and appreciate your continued support,” the owner said.
(Editor’s note: this story first appeared in the Westside Current on April 17 and is reprinted with permission.)
By JAMIE PAIGE
Woolsey Fire (2018): A Catastrophe Exposes Systemic Gaps
The Woolsey Fire Photo: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
When the Woolsey Fire ignited on November 8, 2018, it quickly became an “epic” wildfire that overwhelmed the region’s emergency response institutions. In its first critical hours, the fight was hampered by communication breakdowns and a scarcity of air support, equipment and firefighters.
Multiple major blazes were burning across California that day – including the Hill Fire in Ventura County and the Camp Fire in Paradise – stretching resources thin. As a result, Woolsey’s incident commanders found their urgent calls for help going unanswered.
“Resources were frequently requested for the Woolsey Fire, and those requests went unfulfilled in the first 21.5 hours of the incident,” a county after-action report found. In fact, over half of all engine requests in the first two days went unfilled, a 53% shortfall in mutual aid that “partly explains why Malibu residents may have felt abandoned” during the fire.
Interagency coordination issues compounded the problem. The Woolsey Fire ignited on the Los Angeles–Ventura county line, in an area covered by a joint protection agreement between Ventura County, L.A. County, and Los Angeles City fire departments. In practice, that agreement faltered: Ventura County, already battling the Hill Fire nearby, sent only a skeleton crew to Woolsey, and L.A. County Fire initially held most of its engines back at the county line waiting for the blaze to cross into its jurisdiction. Los Angeles City (LAFD) crews jumped in aggressively on the L.A. city side, but a fully unified command was slow to materialize. Front-line firefighters later complained of a lack of water, communication and direction from incident leaders as the fast-moving inferno raged across 97,000 acres.
We made it out, but barely missed the explosion of embers pushed by hurricane-type winds. There were no firefighters, no police—just chaos. It felt like a war zone. The fire was everywhere, and the confusion and fear were overwhelming.”
Some fire companies in the field reported low water pressure from hydrants and scrambled to find water sources as flames encroached; one dramatic photo captured a firefighter desperately gesturing for “more water pressure” along Pacific Coast Highway as a house burned.
It was a stark indication that even the basic infrastructure needed to fight the fire was strained to the breaking point.
Evacuation Failures
People trying to evacuate were trapped in their cars during the Palisades Fire. Firefighters told them to get out and walk to the beach. The cars on the left side were unburned. The cars on the right side burned. In order to make way for firetrucks, a bulldozer pushed the cars to the side.
Evacuation procedures during the Woolsey Fire proved equally chaotic. The blaze forced nearly 300,000 people, yet Los Angeles County’s emergency management system was unprepared to handle such a massive operation.
“The Woolsey Fire was one of the most stressful and terrifying experiences of our lives,” said Frank Trejo, a father of three who lives on Malibou Lake. “We watched in disbelief as the flames pushed south from the 118 Freeway, eventually crossing the 101, tearing toward Paramount Ranch, and racing to Malibou Lake. The fear was amplified by the complete uncertainty—no one knew when to evacuate or which direction was even safe.”
Trejo said he and his family began packing their cars before midnight. Though they couldn’t yet see flames from the lake, they watched the fire’s advance unfold on television.
“By 2 a.m., we heard a mandatory evacuation order,” he said. “We evacuated, and the fire had already overrun Paramount Ranch and was consuming both sides of Cornell Road. We made it out, but barely missed the explosion of embers pushed by hurricane-type winds. There were no firefighters, no police—just chaos. It felt like a war zone. The fire was everywhere, and the confusion and fear were overwhelming.”
“There were no emergency auto calls to cell phones, no sirens and no bullhorns warning us to leave. If it hadn’t been for my husband listening to the radio, my son and I might have been in the house when the fire reached our neighborhood.”
According to the official after-action review, sheriff’s deputies in the field “did not have accurate information for evacuating residents,” and many communities lacked pre-planned evacuation routes.
“My neighbors informed me that they were evacuated around 3:00 a.m. on the 8th, but my family never received that notice,” said Meghan Gallagher, a resident of Cornell. “My husband and I started our day as usual, with him leaving for work while I stayed home to get our 13-year-old son ready for school. At around 7:45 a.m., I received an automated call from my son’s school, stating that they were closing for the day due to possible unhealthy air quality from a nearby fire.”
Shortly afterward, her husband called from the Malibu area, where he had heard on the radio that the fire had jumped the freeway. He urged her to begin packing important items in case an evacuation became necessary. Then, the power went out.
“As I began loading the car, I noticed a fire truck driving down Mulholland [Highway] with some firefighters walking on foot,” she said. “They informed me that the area had been evacuated and that I should leave immediately. I explained that we had not been notified and assured them I was leaving right away.”
Gallagher, her son, four dogs, two cats, and what few belongings they could gather—missing many important family papers and photos—piled into the car. But when she tried to open the gate with the automatic remote, it didn’t work due to the power outage.
“I didn’t know how to open it manually, so I called out to the firefighters for help,” she said. “Two of them ran back to my house, jumped over an 8-foot wall, and used bolt cutters to manually cut the gate’s chain and push it open. They instructed me to head to the right, as the fire was approaching Cornell and Mulholland.”
Gallagher described the evacuation process as “chaotic, disorganized and poorly orchestrated.”
“There were no emergency auto calls to cell phones, no sirens and no bullhorns warning us to leave,” she said. “If it hadn’t been for my husband listening to the radio, my son and I might have been in the house when the fire reached our neighborhood.”
Beyond her community, the same failures played out across the region. Except for one pre-existing evacuation plan for Topanga Canyon, officials lacked detailed knowledge of which roads could handle mass traffic.
There was “no plan for how to convert Pacific Coast Highway into a one-way road,” according to the review, forcing a single California Highway Patrol officer to improvise traffic flow on the fly.
That led to severe bottlenecks as residents tried to flee down the coast.
Communication also broke down. Authorities relied heavily on social media updates, assuming word would spread organically, but “had no unified strategy for notifications” and defaulted to fragmented communication between agencies.
“The assumption that everyone is digitally connected 24/7… is still a faulty assumption,” noted one emergency alert expert, emphasizing that effective evacuation orders must be delivered consistently across all available channels—social media, television, radio, and wireless emergency alerts—to reach the broadest audience.
During Woolsey, that didn’t happen. Many residents, like the Gallaghers, reported confusion, lack of guidance, and uncertainty about whether it was safe to leave—or to return.
Further controversy emerged around political interference. In the aftermath, the Los Angeles Fire Department revealed that numerous calls from politicians and well-connected individuals demanding protection for specific homes distracted fire commanders at the height of the Woolsey battle.
“A significant number of requests by political figures to check on specific addresses… distracted [the] Department leadership from priority objectives,” LAFD’s own after-action report noted bluntly. Senior officers cautioned that such VIP requests, while common in wealthy communities, must not derail incident command.
During Woolsey, however, precious time and resources were diverted to respond to these inquiries, an illustration of how improper influence and lack of clear protocol can hamper emergency response.
In sum, the Woolsey inferno – which destroyed over 1,600 structures and claimed three lives – exposed critical weaknesses: strained mutual aid and interagency coordination, inadequate water infrastructure under extreme conditions, flawed evacuation planning, poor public communication, and even lapses in command focus.
Officials vowed that the tragedy would serve as a wake-up call.
Dozens of reforms were recommended in the county’s 203-page post-action report to address these failures. As one section warned, residents could not assume that fire agencies would always be able to save them, especially when multiple disasters strike at once. The true test would be whether Los Angeles County and its partner agencies would act decisively on Woolsey’s hard lessons – or risk repeating them.
Slow Progress and Warnings Unheeded (2019–2023)
The Woolsey Fire in 2018, as people tried to evacuate on Pacific Coast Highway.
In the year following Woolsey, Los Angeles County leaders did initiate changes. A consultant team produced 88 specific recommendations, and by 2022 the county claimed it acted on over 80% of those.
County leaders said that improvements were made in emergency alert systems, interagency training, and community outreach. The county Office of Emergency Management, under new leadership, pledged to “drive change and improvement countywide” using the Woolsey report’s findings.
Fire departments updated protocols for unified command in split jurisdictions, hoping to avoid the jurisdictional hesitation seen in Woolsey. There was also discussion of increasing local firefighting resources after Supervisor Janice Hahn noted Woolsey “proved that we can’t rely on mutual aid” alone. In short, officials recognized that mega-fires were becoming a recurring threat and talked of being better prepared.
Yet alongside these steps forward, there were troubling areas of inaction – missed opportunities that would come back to haunt the county. Perhaps most glaring was the failure to upgrade critical water infrastructure in high-fire-risk communities.
In the hills and canyons of Malibu and Topanga, the Woolsey Fire had strained the limited water delivery system, draining hydrants and leaving firefighters begging for pressure. County engineers had long known the system was under-capacity for a wildfire scenario: as far back as 2013, a list of “highest priority” projects called for new water tanks, larger pipes, and inter-connections to bolster fire flow in these areas.
But year after year, those projects stalled. Public records show that plans to add over 1 million gallons of storage and replace aging, “leak-prone” pipelines were left on the drawing board, delayed by funding shortfalls, environmental reviews, and, by some accounts, local opposition to development.
A proposed emergency pipeline link between Malibu’s system and a neighboring water district – which a 2015 plan said could “prevent water shortages” in a catastrophe – sat unbuilt as bureaucratic delays piled up.
By 2019, county supervisors again listed these water system upgrades as urgent, budgeting roughly $59 million for 13 projects and setting a target of completion by 2024. But that timeline slipped. As of late 2024, most projects had not even broken ground.
The community’s lukewarm support for infrastructure investment was part of the problem: Malibu residents, who pay some of the highest water rates in the county, protested rate hikes and worried that expanded water capacity could spur unwanted development.
In the end, despite Woolsey’s stark warning about firefighting water needs, the hardening of the water infrastructure remained largely undone by the time the next fires struck.
Emergency evacuation planning for vulnerable populations was another deficit slow to be addressed. Woolsey’s evacuations had been chaotic but ultimately succeeded in getting most people out alive, in part because many residents self-evacuated early.
However, it was noted that there was no system to identify and assist residents who couldn’t drive or needed special help to evacuate. Advocates pressed the county to create a registry of elderly and disabled residents for disaster planning. While some preliminary efforts were made, a robust plan was not in place by 2024.
Similarly, though communication systems were upgraded – for example, the county gained the ability to send Wireless Emergency Alerts to all cell phones in an area – those tools would need effective use and coordination among agencies to make a difference. As the region would soon learn, technology alone couldn’t fix deeper coordination problems.
Through late 2023, officials repeatedly warned that Southern California’s wildfire risk was as high as ever. Drought, overgrown vegetation, and more frequent wind events meant that the “next Woolsey” was not a question of if, but when.
Fire departments conducted drills and pre-deployed crews during red flag wind forecasts. But even as minor brush fires flared and were subdued, the lingering unfilled gaps – in infrastructure, in fully unified emergency command, and in detailed evacuation logistics – remained perilous vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, it would take back-to-back disasters in the winter of 2024–25 to reveal just how much work was left unfinished.
Franklin Fire (Dec 2024): A Narrow Escape in Malibu
The Franklin Fire erupted amid fierce Santa Ana winds in the Malibu Canyon/Corral Canyon area – the same region devastated by the Woolsey Fire six years earlier.
Fanned by gusts topping 50 mph, the wildfire raced through chaparral in the mountains above the coast, at one point threatening Pepperdine University and nearby neighborhoods. For Malibu residents, it was an eerie case of déjà vu.
“Although the Franklin fire has scorched about 4,000 acres, it pales in comparison to the nearly 97,000-acre Woolsey fire in 2018, which still looms large in many residents’ minds,” locals braced for the worst. Memories of 2018’s firestorm had people packing their cars at the first whiff of smoke.
This time, the outcome was markedly better. Over 20,000 residents were ordered or warned to evacuate during the Franklin Fire’s peak, but firefighters managed to prevent a catastrophe.
By the time winds eased and cooler, moist Pacific air rolled in, approximately 4,000 acres had burned 20 structures and to 28 others, encompassing both residential and commercial properties – a tragedy for those families, but a fraction of Woolsey’s destruction.
Officials credited improved coordination and a bit of luck. Multiple fire agencies, including L.A. County Fire and Cal Fire, attacked the Franklin blaze in a unified command from the outset.
Aircraft were mobilized quickly, and ground crews took advantage of firefighting tactics refined since Woolsey. “We’ve had a lot of good success… we were able to repopulate residents back into their homes,” Incident Commander Dusty Martin announced at a community briefing, just five days after the fire started.
The message was that the Franklin Fire had been contained and life in Malibu was returning to normal.
Yet, underlying problems were evident even in this “successful” firefight. Veteran residents noted that it was only a fortuitous shift in weather – a lull in the Santa Ana winds and rising humidity – that truly turned the tide. Had the gale continued, Franklin could have easily swept into central Malibu. In fact, fire commanders kept wary eyes on forecasts of another wind event the following week, knowing how fast conditions could turn.
Moreover, some of the vulnerabilities from 2018 were still present. Water pressure in the remote canyons remained a concern; firefighters, while not as hamstrung as during Woolsey, still had to truck water into some areas.
At least one local homeowner became a symbol of resident self-reliance: lacking confidence that help would arrive in time, he stayed behind with a garden hose and even used his swimming pool water to douse embers around his property.
Such stories echoed the Woolsey era, when a handful of Malibu citizens famously formed impromptu fire brigades to save homes. Ideally, residents wouldn’t feel compelled to take such risks, but the fact they did suggests gaps in on-the-ground coverage. Franklin was a warning shot that even with better preparation, nature could still overwhelm, and critical infrastructure upgrades were still desperately needed.
“If my neighbor hadn’t texted me before the blackout, I wouldn’t have known there was a fire and to evacuate.”
One infrastructure failure during the Franklin Fire foreshadowed a much bigger crisis to come: fire hydrants in parts of Malibu simply could not deliver enough water. Residents in several neighborhoods reported that hydrants ran dry or had very weak flow as firefighters tried to draw water.
In the end, Franklin’s footprint was limited enough that these shortfalls did not cost lives, but they highlighted the years-long delay in strengthening the water system. The same trouble spots that struggled for water during Woolsey – poorly supplied canyon areas and dead-end water lines – still had not been fixed by 2024. Los Angeles County had been warned repeatedly about this vulnerability, but the fixes were slow in coming.
Communication was also still lacking. Karen Doyle, who rents a small studio east of Malibu, said the lack of communication during the Fire was especially troubling. Her power had already been cut that morning, leaving her without cell service or Wi-Fi. “If my neighbor hadn’t texted me before the blackout, I wouldn’t have known there was a fire and to evacuate,” Doyle said.
Franklin Fire thus ended as a mixed story: on one hand, it showed improved emergency response coordination and quicker containment relative to a Woolsey-level event. On the other hand, it underlined how some Woolsey lessons had not fully translated into action on the ground.
As Malibu’s fire-weary residents breathed a sigh of relief, many hoped the near-miss would spur officials to finally complete the protective measures that had languished. Little did they know, an even more ferocious windstorm and wildfire were only weeks away – and this time, the consequences would be far worse.
Palisades Fire (Jan 2025): History Repeats with Deadly Consequences
In the predawn hours of January 7, 2025, disaster struck Los Angeles on a scale that eclipsed even the nightmare of Woolsey. A fierce Santa Ana wind event – the most powerful in years – blasted through the region, toppling trees and power lines.
Around 10:30 a.m., fire crews were dispatched to a brush fire igniting near the boundary of Pacific Palisades and Malibu. Fueled by hurricane-force gusts, the Palisades Fire exploded through dry coastal canyons, racing toward neighborhoods in the Pacific Palisades and into unincorporated Malibu-adjacent communities.
Within hours it grew into a conflagration over 23,000 acres, jumping roads and forcing more than 105,000 residents were evacuated as the wildfire rapidly spread. The fire, driven by hurricane-force Santa Ana winds. By nightfall, much of the seaside enclave was an apocalyptic scene – entire streets of homes on fire, iconic hillside vistas cloaked in thick smoke, and embers flying in “vortexes” of wind as residents scrambled to evacuate.
Officials warned that the “worst is yet to come” with overnight winds expected to intensify, grounding firefighting aircraft and leaving exhausted ground crews almost on their own.
The Palisades Fire would rage for days, along with another blaze that erupted 35 miles away in Altadena (the Eaton Fire) during the same windstorm. By the time the winds subsided and the fires were contained, the toll was staggering.
In Pacific Palisades and Malibu, nearly 7,000 homes and buildings were reduced to ashes and 12 people lost their lives, making it “likely the costliest disaster in L.A. history,” according to officials. Another 17 people died in the Altadena fire, most of them senior citizens who could not escape in time.
The devastation in the Palisades Fire zone cut across westside city neighborhoods and rustic county areas alike. It marked a devastating bookend to the promises made after Woolsey: many of the very failures identified in 2018 resurfaced in 2025, now with even deadlier consequences.
Water infrastructure collapse was perhaps the most glaring repeat failure during the Palisades Fire.
As firefighters surged into the burning neighborhoods, they often found no water in the hydrants. Later investigations revealed that at least 20% of the hydrants in use went dry as the small local water system was overwhelmed. In one stark example, the 117-million-gallon Santa Ynez Reservoir – a huge city water tank above the Palisades – had been drained for maintenance and was empty on the day of the fire.
That reservoir could have supplied crucial backup water; instead it sat useless due to poor timing of repairs. This left firefighters entirely dependent on the under-built county water mains in the area, which could not maintain pressure once multiple hoses were open. Crews radioed in frantic calls for water tenders (tank trucks) because hydrants were sputtering.
One firefighter described the moment as “a nightmare scenario of no water” as homes burned around him. Neighbors with swimming pools offered them as water sources of last resort.
Governor Gavin Newsom said he was stunned by reports of hydrants failing, “losing supplies from fire hydrants likely impaired the effort to protect some homes and evacuation corridors” during the fire. He ordered an investigation, declaring, “We need answers to ensure this does not happen again.”
Those answers, however, were already hiding in plain sight. A trove of public records later showed that the water disaster was years in the making. L.A. County officials missed dozens of opportunities to implement water system improvements that experts say probably would have enabled firefighters to save more homes.
Plans for additional storage tanks, high-capacity pumps, and inter-district pipeline connections — many “specifically aimed at improving ‘fire flow’ and ensuring enough water during emergencies” — had been drawn up over the past decade but never completed.
The long-delayed upgrades, estimated at under $60 million, would have been a drop in the bucket compared to the billions in damage now wrought by the fire. That painful lesson was not lost on residents.
Emergency response coordination and leadership decisions during the Palisades Fire have also come under harsh scrutiny, amid allegations that authorities again fell short.
One major question is whether LAFD and L.A. County Fire – sharing responsibility at the city/county boundary – had pre-positioned sufficient resources given the extreme wind forecasts.
In the Woolsey aftermath, fire departments vowed to pre-deploy strike teams before big wind events. In early January 2025, some extra crews were staged in Southern California as a precaution. But in Los Angeles, it appears the preparations were inadequate. Just three days before the fire, L.A. Mayor Karen Bass had left the country on a trip to Africa even as weather reports warned of a “particularly dangerous” fire situation. And as the firestorm hit, coordination between agencies became strained.
While L.A. County Fire took lead on areas outside the city, inside Los Angeles the LAFD was managing its own battle. Which agency’s crews arrived first to the ignition point at Piedra Morada Drive? Did city and county commanders effectively share information in the crucial first hours? The public still doesn’t have a clear answer – and that itself has become a scandal.
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This was the start of the Palisades Fire captured at 10:47 a.m.
Mayor Bass’s office was maintaining “extraordinary secrecy” about the city’s preparations and response, refusing to answer basic questions about deployment decisions. The fire department denied dozens of public records requests from journalist, including the Westside Current, and citizens seeking 911 dispatch logs and internal communications, stonewalling any review of its actions.
The lack of transparency has angered fire victims.
“People want answers and are getting no answers,” Sue Pascoe told the LA Times in a recent story. Pascoe, a 30-year Palisades resident who lost her home and is the founder of Circling the News, a local online outlet that has provided critical information during and in the aftermath of the fires.
Pascoe also expressed frustration about the City withholding information about 911 calls during the emergency.
A recall campaign even targeted Bass herself for perceived failures in leadership. The secrecy and finger-pointing suggest that, much like after Woolsey, interagency coordination and command once again faltered when put to the ultimate test. Without an open accounting, the community is left to suspect that vital errors were made behind closed doors.
The evacuation of residents during the Palisades Fire and its sister blaze in Altadena revealed perhaps the most heartbreaking repeat of past mistakes. In Malibu and Pacific Palisades, evacuation orders did go out more promptly than in 2018, aided by wireless alerts that blared on cell phones. But even with improved notification systems, the chaos on the ground echoed the failures of Woolsey.
Most mobile, able-bodied residents managed to flee the fast-approaching flames – hence the relatively low death toll in the Palisades portion of the fire. Even so, some local evacuation plans broke down.
Infamous images showed lines of abandoned cars along narrow canyon roads as residents tried to flee—many on foot after traffic came to a standstill. Dramatic video footage captured scenes of confusion and panic, highlighting how little had changed in the years since the last major firestorm.
But the greatest tragedy unfolded in the foothill community of Altadena, illustrating that L.A. County as a whole had still not developed effective procedures to protect its most vulnerable residents. There, in the Eaton Canyon Fire on the same day, 17 people – many of them elderly or disabled – perished when flames overtook their neighborhood. The median age of the victims was 77, and at least a third had mobility impairments.
A Los Angeles Times investigation later found that official evacuation alerts to West Altadena went out nearly nine hours late, long after the fire had started. By the time deputies and firefighters arrived to help evacuate a senior living facility, it was too late for some residents. “The systems which were supposed to be in place for emergencies not only didn’t function, they didn’t even seem to exist,” said one grieving friend of an Altadena victim.
In Pacific Palisades, a similar story nearly played out: the city of L.A. had no official registry of disabled residents to prioritize in evacuations, so a nonprofit disability center scrambled to contact people they knew in the area and even called rideshares to assist those in need. It was pure luck that more lives weren’t lost on the west side of town.
These incidents underscore a devastating fact – despite the Woolsey Fire’s lessons, Los Angeles County still lacked a robust, practiced plan to evacuate those who cannot rescue themselves, whether due to age, illness or disability. It was a known gap in 2018 and remained so in 2025.
Recurring Failures and Missed Opportunities
Fires continued to destroy Pacific Palisades on January 8.
From the Woolsey Fire to the Franklin and Palisades fires, a clear pattern emerges of recurring problems and missed opportunities that compounded the severity of each disaster.
Chief among them: Inadequate water infrastructure for firefighting. Both Woolsey and Palisades saw firefighters literally running out of water at the worst possible moments. Woolsey’s after-action report highlighted water pressure problems in Malibu, yet the promised upgrades were delayed for years. In 2025, hydrants ran dry and planned emergency water sources were unavailable.
Experts agree that had the county completed even a few key projects – bigger storage tanks, inter-system connections – fire crews likely could have saved more homes. The failure to act decisively on infrastructure, despite ample warning, is perhaps the most tangible missed opportunity linking Woolsey to Palisades.
In all three fires, moments of confusion and hesitation by agencies cost precious time. Woolsey saw a disjointed tri-agency response at the outset, as Ventura County, L.A. County, and LAFD struggled to coordinate.
Franklin benefited from a smoother unified command, but then Palisades showed coordination issues between the City of L.A. and County once again – evidenced by the post-fire secrecy and leadership turmoil at LAFD.
The failure to establish transparent, unified incident command in a complex, multi-jurisdiction fire remains an unsolved problem. After Woolsey, officials knew they had to improve mutual aid and communication; by Palisades, it appears some of those improvements were either insufficient or not effectively implemented under pressure.
Woolsey’s chaotic evacuation exposed the need for better planning and public communication. Some progress was made (for instance, wireless alerts used in Palisades), but the fundamental challenge of evacuating large, diverse populations swiftly and safely persists.
The flow of critical information, both to the public and internally between agencies, has repeatedly broken down. During Woolsey, public alerts were scattershot and over-reliant on social media.
By Palisades, the use of cellphone alerts had improved outreach, but communication issues shifted to the aftermath – where LAFD’s refusal to release records has damaged public trust. A lack of transparency can mask operational mistakes that need addressing.
Woolsey’s extensive post-fire review at least identified problems so they could be fixed; in contrast, the Palisades response has, so far, been shrouded in silence, which could impede learning any lessons. Effective crisis management requires honest communication in real time and after the fact, something authorities have struggled with in these incidents.
Today, many residents impacted by the Woolsey Fire are still picking up the pieces. Empty lots, RVs parked on burned-out properties, and for-sale signs serve as daily reminders that the community is still in recovery.
“To this day, we’re still saddened by all those who lost everything,” Trejo said.
As Palisades residents begin their own long road to recovery, the scars left behind by Woolsey serve as both a warning and a lesson. The path forward will require not only resilience, but vigilance—because for fire-prone communities like these, the threat never truly disappears. Yet amid the loss, one constant remains: the strength of neighbors standing together, determined to rebuild what was lost and protect what remains.
Firefighters from Roseburg put out a spot fire on Chautauqua January 12.
Mayor Karen Bass and Councilmember Traci Park thanked ACE members (left to right) Colonel Jeff Palazzini, Colonel Brian Sawser, General William Hannan, Jr. and Captain Sheldon Tausch. As they are being reassigned, Tausch and Sawser were given certificates of thanks from the City for their help.
“Today marks 100 days since the disaster,” said Mayor Karen Bass at an April 17 press conference at the site of the former Palisades Library, which burned in the January 7 Palisades Fire. “This has been a hundred days of resilience and one hundred days of inspiration.”
Today was special because Palisades Library building debris had been cleared by the Army Corp of Engineers, so that the next stage could begin. “It was supposed to take 30 days,” Bass said. “They did it in six.”
Senior Librarian Mary Huptf, Administrative Clerk Roberta Frank, Friends of the Library President Laura Schneider and City Librarian John Szabo joined Bass and Councilmember Traci Park in thanking the Army Corps of Engineers for the quick debris removal.
A week ago, the Mayor had stood at the entrance to the Palisades Recreation Center to announce a public-private partnership with L.A. Strong Sports, Steadfast LA and other Palisades groups to rebuild the gym, tennis courts and other areas that had burned in the fire.
Bass pointed out that this area, the Rec Center, the library were the center of the community and held people together. To lose those centers meant people also lost relationships.
“My top priority has been to get people home – that means rebuilding houses, but it also means rebuilding the places that make up the heart of the community,” she said.
Park, who had just returned from a fact-finding trip to Lahaina the night before said “I want to thank Colonel Brian Sawser, Captain Sheldon Tausch, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for their service – our community is truly grateful for their commitment.”
She thanked the Corps for their empathy and their professionalism. “There work here has been phenomenal. . . .and not only here but the hundreds of lots they have cleared.”
Park said she was in City Council Chambers when the fire started and praised her staff for rushing to the Palisades, hosing down roofs, helping evacuate the elderly and helping evacuate animals. “During my first sleepless weeks, my thoughts never left the people,” she said, and noted that the “recovery should be community led, with support from the government.”
After months in the Palisades, Sawser and Tausch have been reassigned and were given certificates from the City. “I operated in partnership with this endeavor in Palisades,” Sawser said. “Thank you for the individual recognition, but this is a team effort. There are hundreds of ACE employees that have rotated in and out. There are thousands of contractors, mostly from Southern California, who have worked seven days a week.
“What they have accomplished is a sign that renewal is coming,” Sawser said and added, that he looks forward to coming back and seeing the town once its rebuilt.
The City Librarian said, “It’s difficult to stand here today, but with the debris removed, there is a sense of hope.”
Szabo was asked what it would cost to construct a new library and said they are currently in talks with architects. “There is no estimate of costs, but that the cost of building will be 100 percent reimbursed by FEMA.”
How does one fill a new library with books? Szabo said that they put together “an opening day collection,” through purchases and added that “We have a wonderful Friends of the Library here we can work with.”
Librarian Huptf “What the Corps has done is phenomenal. This means a lot to me.”
The Methodist Church on Via de la Paz burned on January 8.
Pastor John Shaver of the Community United Methodist Church in Pacific Palisades, not only lost a home, the parish, where he lived with his family, but the church at 801 Via de la Paz was also destroyed.
He wrote to CTN that “I told the bishop that my hope is to stay and help rebuild and retire at CUMC Pacific Palisades (I have about 20 years left).”
Shaver said the congregation and other interested people are invited to do a Crosswalk Service on April 18, Good Friday at 2 p.m. They will start at the location of the church and walk to the bluffs, carrying a cross and reading scripture along the way. “It will be about a 45-minute walk and people can drive/bike/scooter along, too,” Shaver said.
On Sunday, there will be a short worship service at 1 p.m. at the church campus, around a flower cross. If anyone wants to bring flowers to place on the cross, “that would be great,” Shaver said. It has been a long-time tradition to have a cross with flowers on it by the church entrance at Easter.click here.
“Blessings during this Holy Week,” the pastor said.
Thousands gathered for this Easter Sunday sunrise prayer service in the newly named community of Pacific Palisades in 1922. The future seemed bright for founder and Methodist minister Charles Scott’s vision of a “Christian utopia.” Photo courtesy of Ernest Marquez Collection, Huntington Digital Library
Mayor Karen Bass is like Lucy holding the football–Bass keeps saying she’ s working on building permit waivers/fees, but so far she keeps pulling them out of reach.
L.A. Mayor Karen Bass is like Lucy in the Charlie Brown cartoon strip. In her hand she holds the football (building permit waivers) and every time someone from the Palisades or someone associated with construction goes to the City, she pulls the ball away.
And just like Lucy, Bass has several excuses. “We’re still working on it. There are legal issues. These kind of things can’t happen just like that.”
In an effort to help Bass with the legal issues, CTN reached out to the City Attorney Hydee Feldstein Soto’s office on April 13.
Soto’s Public Information Officer Ivor Pine replied April 16, “We are working with the Mayor’s Office and City Council on alternatives. Hope that helps.”
CTN replied it didn’t help because it didn’t answer the question, which was “why can’t she legally waive the fees with an executive order.”
There is an urgency to having fees waived if the City wants residents to rebuild. The cost to build in Los Angeles for permits and fees can run from $40,000 to $80,000 or more.
Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass on January 31, 2025. (Photo by David Crane, Los Angeles Daily News/SCNG)
On March 13 (Letter: To Mayor Karen Bass – Waive Building Fees for Fire Victims) and again on March 28 (Letter- Waive Permit and Building Fees for Fire Victims), residents spoke about the high costs of building.
Two CTN stories one on March 18 (L.A. City Nees to Waive Building Fees for Fire Victims) and another on April 1(Building Permits/Fees Too Costly to Rebuild after Palisades Fire) building fees were detailed.
Bass has been asked repeatedly about waiving those costs in meetings. In at least three of her webinars, the most recent on April 15, someone asked about waiving fees. Just like Lucy, the City promised it was being looked at and there would be an announcement soon.
In two different press conferences Mayor Bass has been asked by this editor why she doesn’t waive planning, building and permitting fees. She has gone on record as saying there is a legal issue.
During L. A. Mayor Karen Bass’ weekly meeting held via Zoom on April 1, this CTN editor again asked, “When will the Mayor waive building and permit fees?”
A timeline was not given, instead this editor was told that “Councilmember Traci Park had led a motion to come back with an analysis.”
“There will be more clear answers when the legislative timeline is finished,” said Jenny Delwood, the Mayor’s Deputy Chief of Staff.
On March 21, this editor asked about waiving rebuilding fees at Mayoral press conference in the Palisades. Bass replied that she had asked for a list from building and safety and planning of all the fees and to waive everything that they can. She said that some fees they can’t waive, but those that can’t be waived, she would try to have them reduced.
On April 9 at a press conference celebrating the first home being constructed on DePauw, CTN asked about the fees. The home had only been completed three years ago and was being rebuilt. Initially the City told them they had to pay a $9,000 permit fee. The contractor negotiated with the City and they paid $6,000, which he said still felt high. The contractor felt the City should waive the fee.
“Agreed,” Bass said. “It’s not like they chose to remodel; this was an act of God.”
This editor asked the same question at the April 10 press conference and received the same answer from Bass.
Businessman Rick Caruso was asked the same question at that conference and answered “All the fees should be waived.” And said it would just take an executive order. This is a statement he repeated in the 1Pali Podcast on April 14.
Fees have once again been waived in Malibu for the Palisades Fire – and there is precedent in California for waiving these fees in response to devastating fires: